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Rickard v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 120 Nev. Ad. Op. 54, 96 P.3d 743 (2004).1
CIVIL LAW – CIVIL PROCEDURE
Summary
On January 23, 1993, appellant David Rickard was involved in an incident at the
Montgomery Ward store. On April 20, 1993, he filed a complaint in the Clark County District
Court alleging various claims against the store. Approximately four years after the complaint
was filed in court, Ward filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding with the United States
Bankruptcy Court in the District of Delaware. In accordance with federal bankruptcy law,
Rickard’s action in the Nevada district court was stayed.
On August 25, 1998, Rickard filed a motion for relief from stay in order to further his
action against Ward. The bankruptcy court granted Rickard’s motion and on January 27, 1999,
Rickard notified Ward that he had received relief from the stay. Rickard then filed a motion for
a trial with the district court. The motion was unopposed and the district court entered its order
setting a jury trial for August 3, 1999.
On July 23, 1999, Ward filed a motion to dismiss based on Rickard’s failure to bring the
matter to trial within five years as required by NRCP 41(e).2 The motion was denied and Ward
never took any further action on that motion.
On January 23, 2001, at a status check for Rickard’s case, the district court judge
requested that the parties file points and authorities indicating all significant dates to help explain
why the five-year rule had not run on Ward. On April 19, 2001, the district court heard
argument regarding dismissal of Rickard’s action pursuant to NRCP 41(e) and concluded that the
five-year period had run as to Ward and dismissed Rickard’s case. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Rickard asserted the primary theory that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)3, the
five-year prescriptive period in NRCP 41(e) was tolled of the time period during which Ward
was under the protection of the bankruptcy court. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that
although 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) in itself does not toll the five-year period, there is no reason to
distinguish between a court ordered stay and the automatic stay imposed by federal bankruptcy
law under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Therefore, Rickard’s claim was not tolled under NRCP 41(e).
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NEV. R. CIV. P. 41(e) (2000) provides in pertinent part:
Want of Prosecution…Any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the
court in which the same shall have been commenced or to which it may be transferred on motion
of any party, or on the court’s own motion, after due notice to the parties, unless such action is
brought to trial within five years after the plaintiff has filed his action, except where the parties
have stipulated in writing that the time may be extended.
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11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2000) states in pertinent part:
[I]f applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an
agreement fixes a period for commencing or continuing civil action in a court other than a
bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor, . . . and such period has not expired before the
date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of (1) the end of
such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of
the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay.

Issue and Disposition
Issue
Is the five-year prescriptive period under NRCP 41(e) tolled for the period that a stay is
imposed by a debtor’s bankruptcy?
Disposition
Yes. There is no distinction between a court order stay which tolls the prescriptive period
and the automatic stay imposed by federal bankruptcy law pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
Commentary
State of the Law Before Rickard
Prior to Rickard, the Nevada Supreme Court had firmly established the purpose of the
mandatory4 language of NRCP 41(e) which is to compel expeditious determinations of legitimate
claims.5
In Boren v. City of North Las Vegas6, the court considered the issue of whether a court
ordered stay tolled NRCP 41(e)’s five-year prescriptive period. The court determined that “[a]ny
period during which the parties are prevented from bringing an action to trial by reason of a stay
order shall not be computed in determining the five-year period of Rule 41(e).”7
Therefore, the court established that although the prescriptive period provided by NRCP
41(e) is mandatory, it can be tolled by a court ordered stay.
Effect of Rickard on Current Law
The court in Rickard disagreed with appellant’s argument that NRCP 41(e)’s five-year
period was tolled due to 11 U.S.C. § 108(c). Yet, the court determined that any action based on a
creditor’s liability can be tolled due to a different section of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. §
362(a).
The court determined that section 108(c) is an exclusive provision of the bankruptcy code
which deals with the effect of a bankruptcy filing on the running of statutes of limitation. It
further stated that Congress had enacted the section to prevent debtors who file bankruptcy in
order to let the statute of limitations run, from using the expiration of the limitations period as a
complete defense.8 By its terms, section 108(c) does not toll any applicable limitations period
(i.e. NRCP 41(e)). The court found that the section’s language “merely incorporates suspensions
of deadlines that are expressly provided in other federal or state statutes.”9
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The court then determined that another section of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. §
362(a) did toll the prescriptive period. Section 362(a) imposes an automatic stay of any action to
collect on liability of a debtor. The court came to this equitable conclusion based on previous
case law which stated that a court ordered stay can toll the prescriptive period required in NRCP
41(e). The court saw no reason why a court ordered stay and the automatic stay imposed by
federal bankruptcy law should be treated differently.
Survey of the Law in Other Jurisdictions
The court’s conclusion is consistent with holdings in other jurisdictions which have held
that actions filed by creditors against a debtor are tolled due to the automatic stay entered in the
debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).10
Conclusion
Although the five-year prescriptive period required by NRCP 41(e) is not tolled by 11
U.S.C. § 108(c), the time period is tolled by the automatic stay of actions imposed by 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a). This decision was based on current court decisions which have held that the
prescriptive period is tolled by a court ordered stay. The Nevada Supreme Court determined that
there are no differences between a court ordered stay and the automatic stay imposed by federal
bankruptcy law.
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